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Abstract
We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made
up of coalition systems, in which every unit coalition is feasible and every coalition of players can
be expressed as a disjoint union of maximal feasible coalitions. These systems are named partition
systems and cause restricted games. To sum up, we study feasible coalition systems defined by a
partial order designed for a set of players and we analyze the characteristics of a feasible coalition
system developed from a family of convex sets.
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1 Partial cooperation
A system of feasible cooperations is defined by (N,F ), F ⊆ 2N , that proves the following
axiom:
(P1) ∅ ∈ F , and the group {i} ∈ F ∀ i ∈ N.
Considering the given explanation, it results that any coalition S ⊆ N can be
expressed by a disjoint union of feasible coalitions, as
S =
⋃
a∈S
{a}.
However, this partition of S for feasible coalitions should not be unique. In general,
we will denote PF (S ) the set made up of partitions of S ⊆ N in nonempty feasible
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coalitions. Obviously PF (∅) = {∅}. The previous reasoning gives sense to and makes
consistent the idea of a restricted cooperation game:Define the triple (N,F , v), in which
(N,F ) is a feasible coalition system and (N, v) a transferable utility game. Then the
couple (N, vF ) in which
vF : 2N R, vF (S ) = max

∑
i
v(Ti) | {Ti} ∈ PF (S )
 .
is termed a game with restricted cooperation by the feasible coalition system (N,F ).
The supplied explanation for game of restricted cooperation by a system of feasible
coalitions is for every coalition of players, an extension of the one by Faigle (1989)
concerning games with restricted cooperations and by Bergantin˜os, Carreras and
Garcı´a–Jurado (1993) when using communication graphs to show incompatibility
among some of the players. Indeed, it can be shown that vF (S ) ≥
∑
i∈S v({i}). Defined
this way, the game is always superadditive.
Let (N,F ) be a system of feasible coalitions. Let S ⊆ N. It is said that T is F –
component of S if it is proved that T ∈ F and T ′ ∈ F does not exist, as T ⊂ T ′ ⊆ S .
That is to say, the S ⊆ N F –components are the maximal feasible coalitions included
in S and, for any S ⊆ N, the F –components of S are a collection {Tk}k ⊂ 2
S such that
S =
⋃
k
Tk
But, the F –components of S ⊆ N are not necessarily a partition of S as its intersection
can be nonempty.
It can be proved that if we consider (N,F , v), where (N,F ) is a feasible coalition
system, (N, v) a superadditive game and, for each coalition S ⊆ N, the F –components
of S are a partition of itself, then the restricted cooperation game (N, vF ) verifies
vF (S ) =
∑
k
v(Tk),
where {Tk}k ∈ PF , the S partition for its maximal feasible coalitions (F –components of
S ).
Therefore, if the F –components of any coalition are a partition of itself, and the
game (N, v) is superadditive, then the restricted game by the system of feasible coalitions
is determined by
vF (S ) =
∑
k
v(Tk),
in which {Tk}k is the S partition for maximal feasible coalitions. As the previous
expression requires that maximal feasible coalitions must be disjointed, a new definition
for a concrete feasible coalitions system has to be looked for. It will be named a partition
system .
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A partition system is the couple (N,F ), F ⊆ 2N that verifies the following axioms:
(P1) ∅ ∈ F , {i} ∈ F ∀ i ∈ N.
(P2) ∀ S ⊆ N, the S maximal subsets in F (F –components of S ) are a partition of S ,
denoted by
CF (S ) = {S 1, . . . , S k}.
Evidently, a partition system is a feasible coalitions system, so, the F elements will
not change their name.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a natural number n, and considering the collection
Ln made of all the sets such as [i, j] = {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, j} for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n. This
model represents a one-dimensional political election situation and the couple (N,Ln)
is a partition system.
Example 2 A communication situation is the triple (N,G, v), in which (N, v) is a game
and G = (N, E(N)) is a graph. This idea was first developed by Myerson (1977), and
researched by Owen (1986) and Borm, Nouweland and Tijs (1992, 1993). It is easy to
see that the couple (N,F ), in which
F = {S ⊆ N | (S , E(S )) is a connected subgraph of G},
is a partition system. We must point out that the opposite is not always true, because
every G graph is a collection of pairs {i, j}, and as a result, there must be feasible
collections made up of two elements, but this might not happen.
The previous definitions come from an extension of communication situation and
communication graph-restricted game, developed by Myerson (1977) and Owen (1986).
The following theorem shows a characterization of the concept of partition systems.
Theorem 1 A feasible coalitions system (N,F ), F ⊆ 2N is a partition system if and
only if
∀A ∈ F , B ∈ F , con A ∩ B , ∅ =⇒ A ∪ B ∈ F .
Proof. (⇐) Considering that the F -components of A ⊆ N form a recover, it is
only necessary to prove that every pair of F –components of A are disjointed. Let Ti,
T j (i , j) maximal feasible coalitions of A. If Ti∩T j , ∅ ,it would mean, hypothesizing,
Ti ∪ T j ∈ F being Ti ∪ T j ⊂ A. This contradicts that Ti and T j are maximal feasible
coalitions of A.
(⇒) Let A ∈ F , B ∈ F with A ∩ B , ∅. If A ∪ B < F , then
A ∪ B =
⋃
k
Tk,
where {Tk} is the partition of A ∪ B for maximal sets. As A and B are feasible coalitions
contained in A ∪ B, thus A ⊆ T j, B ⊆ Tp for every j and p. If j , p, then T j ∩ Tp = ∅
142 Partial cooperation and convex sets
and, so, A∩B = ∅ against the hypothesis; then A∪B ∈ F . If j = p then A ⊆ T j ⊆ A ∪ B
and B ⊆ T j ⊆ A ∪ B, implies A ∪ B = T j ∈ F . ¤
2 Partially ordered set restricted games
The aim of this section is to study a feasible coalition system defined by a partial order
for all players. From this moment only posets P = (N,≤) will be considered and the
feasible coalition system characteristics developed from the family of convex sets will
be analyzed.
Let P = (N,≤) a poset. It is said that A ⊆ N is convex in P if it is proved that
a ∈ A, b ∈ A and a ≤ b =⇒ [a, b] ⊆ A.
If P = (N,≤) is a poset, we are interested in obtaining P∗ = (N,≤), the dual of P,
with
x ≤ y en P∗ ⇐⇒ y ≤ x en P.
It can be proved that Co(P) ' Co(P∗), ∀ P (Birkoff and Bennett, 1985).The family of
convex sets in P will be denoted
Co(P) = {S ⊆ N | S is convex in P}.
This characterization implies, ∀ i ∈ N, {i} ∈ Co(P) so the couple (N,Co(P)) is a
feasible coalitions system. Then, given a game (N, v), if there is an order relation among
the players, it makes sense to take into consideration the triple (N,Co(P), v) and the
appropriate partial cooperation game,
vCo(P) | 2N −→ R, vCo(P)(S ) = max

∑
i
v(Ti) | {Ti} ∈ PCo(P)(S )
 ,
where PCo(P)(S ) is the family of partitions from the coalition S in convex sets in P.
It is easy to prove that A, B ∈ Co(P), that A ∩ B ∈ Co(P), impliying (N,Co(P)) a
closure space. Also, Edelman and Jamison (1985), Birkoff and Bennett (1985) think that
(N,Co(P)) proves the Minkowski–Krein–Milman condition, and, therefore an atomic
convex geometry, named order convex in N.
As (N,Co(P)) is a feasible coalition system, every subset in N can be expressed
as a union of it maximal convex sets. In this particular case, the maximal convex
definition of S ⊆ N in P is equivalent to the one by Tijs (1993), which is due to the
two (N,Co(P)) being a convex geometry: Let (N,Co(P)) be a feasible coalition system
and let S ⊆ N. If T ∈ Co(P) and T ⊆ N, then T is maximal convex S in P if and only if,
∀i ∈ S \ T, T ∪ {i} < Co(P).
Notice that this characterization for maximal convex is certain in all convex
geometry, and, in general, the feasible coalition system (N,Co(P) is not a partition
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Example 2 Let (N,≤) be a poset, whose Hasse diagram is shown in Figure 1,
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Figure 2: (Co(P),⊆) ' (24,⊆)
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The couple (N,Co(P)) is not a partition system, applying Theorem 1, because {1, 3} ∈
Co(P), {3, 4} ∈ Co(P), the intesection is not empty, however, {1, 3} ∪ {3, 4} < Co(P) due
to 1 ≤ 4 y [1, 4] * {1, 3, 4}.
Let P = (N,≤) be a poset whose range or length l(P) might equal 1 or be less than 1.
That is to say:
l(P) = max{l(C) | C is a chain in P and l(C) = |C| − 1} ≤ 1.
Then (N,Co(P)) is a partition convex geometry. As every subset in N is convex, either
due to being an atom or a chain of two elements from N, it implies that Co(P) ' 2N . For
example, in Figure 2, Co(P) ' 24. If l(P) ≤ 1 and if it is considered a partition system
(or partition convex geometry) restricted Co(P)–game linked to the three (N,Co(P), v),
it verifies that vCo(P)(S ) = v(S ), ∀S ∈ 2N and, therefore restricted game and original
game are the same.
It has been proved that if l(P) ≥ 2, the atomic convex geometry (N,Co(P)) is not
necessarily a partition system . This is the reason why only partially ordered sets with
l(P) ≥ 2 are taken into consideration, and we search for conditions to set (N,Co(P)) as
a partition system. We will introduce the concept of completely coherent ordered sets as
given by Birkoff and Bennett (1985).
A poset P = (N,≤) is coherent if it is connected and no maximal element from P
covers any minimal element from P.
For example, the poset in example 3 (Figure 1) is coherent. Other possible situations
are considered below:
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A poset P, with l(P) ≥ 2, is completely coherent if any subposet infered by P, P′
with l(P′) ≥ 2, is coherent. The following figures illustrate this concept. Figure 4 shows
diagrams of coherent posets that are not completely coherent. On the other hand, Figure
5, shows examples of completely coherent posets.
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Notice that completely coherent posets in Figure 5, except the first of them, verify
that P \ ex(P) is a chain. This property will be very important to prove that the cou-
ple (N,Co(P)) is a partition system.
Theorem 2 Let P = (N,≤) be a completely coherent finite poset, as P\ex(P) is a chainC.
Then, every maximal element from P covers the maximum in chain C and the minimal
element from C covers every minimal element from P.
Proof. If P is coherent, it is connected and its maximal elements do not cover any
minimal. Therefore, if x is maximal, it follows that y ∈ P is such that x Â y in which
y < ex(P) because set ex(P) is the union of maximal and minimal elements. Then, y ∈ C
/ y ≤ maxC exists.
• •
•
.
.
.
•
•
x
y
maxC
x′
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
If y , maxC, as maxC is not maximal in P, there is
x′ Â maxC. The induced subposet P′, made up of the
elements {y,maxC, x, x′} verifies that l(P′) = 2 and is not
coherent, in opposition to the hypothesis. Consequently,
y = maxC.
The reasoning for minimal elements is equivalent to the one above. ¤
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The following theorem is the main result from this research. It establishes alternative
characterization for the two (N,Co(P)) to be a partition system.
Theorem 3 Let P = (N,≤) be a finite poset. The couple (N,Co(P)) is a partition system
if and only if P is completely coherent and P \ ex(P) = C is a chain.
Proof. (⇒) Consider that (N,Co(P)) is a partition system. We must prove that P is
completely coherent and P \ ex(P) = C.
If P \ ex(P) , C, there are a, b ∈ P \ ex(P) so that {a, b} is an antichain. As
{a, b} * ex(P), consider the sets
m(a) = {m ∈ P | m ≺ a}, M(a) = {m′ ∈ P | a ≺ m′},
and, analagously, m(b) and M(b). Obviously, these are not empty sets, and it is easy to
notice that m(a) ∩ M(b) = m(b) ∩ M(a) = ∅. However, m(a) ∩ m(b) and M(a) ∩ M(b) ,
these intersections cannot be empty. So, these are the alternatives:
(1) m(a) ∩ m(b) , ∅
(2) M(a) ∩ M(b) , ∅
(3) m(a) ∩ m(b) = M(a) ∩ M(b) = ∅
Using the duality Co(P) ' Co(P∗), we only need to pay attention to (1) and (3).
(1) Let m ∈ m(a) ∩ m(b), m′ ∈ M(a). If b £ m′ (Figure 6), the set {m, b,m′} < Co(P)
and their maximal convexes {{b,m′}, {m, b}} are not its partition. If b ≤ m′ (Figure 7),
{m, a,m′} < Co(P) and their maximal convexes {{a,m′}, {m, a}} are also not its partition.
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(3) Suppose that m(a)∩m(b) = M(a)∩M(b) = ∅ and let m ∈ m(a) and m′ ∈ M(a). If
there is no connection between b and elements m, m′, then {m, b,m′} < Co(P) and their
maximal convexes{{b,m′}, {m, b}} are not its partition (Figure 8). If there was connection
it would be because, m ≤ b, b ≤ m′, one or both of them. In every situation, m < m(b)
and m′ < M(b) such that m(a) ∩ m(b) = M(a) ∩ M(b) = ∅. In all situations, we cannot
find convex sets in which their maximal convexes are not a partition. Indeed, if m ≤ b
there is a b1 such that m ≤ b1 ≤ b (Figure 9) and, for {m, a, b} < Co(P) their maximal
convexes {{m, a}, {a, b}} are not its partition. If b ≤ m′ the reasoning is equivalent.
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Thus, we have proved that if P \ ex(P) , C then the hypothesis is not satisfied.
Suppose that P is not completely coherent. Then, there is an inducted subset P′, with
l(P′) ≥ 2 that is not coherent, therefore P′ is not connected nor does any maximal
element from P′ cover any minimal element from P′.
If P′ is not connected, there are at least two connected components C1, C2 and all
of them have to include a chain with length equal or bigger than 2. Suppose l(C1) ≥ 2.
When we consider the first and last maximal chain C1 element, indicated by {p, u},
together with any a ∈ C2, there is for set {p, u, a} the situation is analogue to the subposet
in Figure 8, so there is a contradiction.
If P′ is connected but any maximal element covers any minimal element, there are m
and m′ (minimal and maximal from P′) such that m ≺ m′. Nevertheless, that m′ covers
m in the subposet P′ does not imply the same in P. So, there are two possibilities:
(1) m ≺ m′ in P ({m,m′} ∈ Co(P)).
(2) m ⊀ m′ in P ({m,m′} < Co(P)).
(1), we consider the set {p, u,m,m′} in which p and u are the first and the last
elements included in a subposet maximal chain P′ (l(P′) ≥ 2). As p and u are extreme
elements in P′, the three situations shown in Figures 10, 11 and 12 arise. There,
{p, u,m,m′} < Co(P) and its maximal convexes are not its partition. (Notice there is
an unknown connection drawn between p and m′, as well as between m and u).
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In (2), if m ⊀ m′ there is p1 ∈ P \ P
′ such as m < p1 < m
′. Let p and u be the first
and the last elements from a subposet maximal chain P′. Then, there is u1 ∈ P
′ such
as p < u1 < u (l(P
′) ≥ 2). Evidently it cannot be u = m′ and p = m, because then
m ⊀ m′ in P′. Therefore, we must take into consideration the situations in which u , m′
and p , m. Because of the duality, it is enough to study one of them. If u , m′, the
situations where it originates (drawn in Figures 13, 14 and 15) are due to {u1, p1} being
an antichain or not.
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If {u1, p1} is an antichain, there is a contradicion due to P \ ex(P) , C. If u1 < p1
or p1 < u1, we consider the sets {u, u1,m
′} < Co(P), {u, p1,m
′} < Co(P). In both cases,
their maximal convexes are not their partition.
(⇐) Notice that if P = (N,≤) is a completely coherent finite poset, such that P\ex(P)
is a chainC, then A ∈ Co(P), B ∈ Co(P) and A∩B , ∅ imply that A∪B ∈ Co(P). The set
A∪B is convex if given a ∈ A∪B, b ∈ A∪Bwith a ≤ b, then [a, b] ⊆ A∪B. The set A∪B
is a disjoint union of A \B, A∩B and B \A; so, among the different possible alternatives
for a and b, we only need to analyze a couple of them: a ∈ A \ B and b ∈ B \ A, or
a ∈ B \ A and b ∈ A \ B. Furthermore, using the duality (Co(P) ' Co(P∗)), it is enough
to analyze only one of the possibilities. Consequently, let a ∈ A\B, b ∈ B\A with a < b.
It must be proved that [a, b] ⊆ A ∪ B and, by hypothesis, A ∩ B , ∅. If there is an
element d ∈ A ∩ B such that d ∈ [a, b], then:
[a, b] = [a, d] ∪ [d, b] ⊆ A ∪ B,
as the intervals of P are always chains (P \ ex(P) = C), {a, d} ⊆ A, {d, b} ⊆ B and
A, B ∈ Co(P).
In the case that any d ∈ A ∩ B is not included in the interval [a, b], the are four
possible alternatives: 1) d < a, 2) b < d, 3) {a, d} is an antichain and 4) {b, d} is an
antichain.
We are going to analyze:
(1) If d < a < b, then [d, b] ⊆ B. Therefore a ∈ B, instead of being a ∈ A \ B.
(2) If a < b < d, then [a, d] ⊆ A. Therefore, b ∈ A which contradicts b ∈ B \ A.
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(3) If {a, d} is an antichain, then a and d are minimal elements (a is not maximal due to
a < b and the only possible antichains in P are made of maximal elements from P or of
minimal elements).
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.
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d¢
¢
¢¢
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AA
Theorem 2 implies that minimal element from chain C, minC
covers a and d. Then d ≺ minC ≤ b and [d, b] ⊆ B as B is
convex and {d, b} ⊆ B. Therefore,
[a, b] = {a} ∪ [minC, b] ⊆ {a} ∪ [d, b] ⊆ A ∪ B.
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.
.
.
•b
a
maxC
d
¡
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(4) Using an analogous reasoning, if {b, d} is an antichain, both
are maximals and it is deduced that d Â maxC ≥ a. Then,
[a, d] ⊆ A y
[a, b] = [a,maxC] ∪ {b} ⊆ A ∪ B.
¤
Obviously, the results above have a theoretical interest. The knowledge of convex
sets, and particulary those structures that lead to partition systems, have a practical
interest, among other possibilities, in order to estimate power indexes —both Banzhaf’s
and Shapley’s— in simple weighted voting games and in double-triple majority games,
in which cooperation is restricted to a feasible coalition set. This application is discussed
in more detail by Bilbao, Jime´nez, Lo´pez and Ferna´ndez (2000).
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Resum
Considerem jocs d’utilitat transferible que tracten amb situacions de cooperacio´ parcial constituı¨des
per sistemes de coalicions, en els que tota coalicio´ unita`ria e´s factible i tota coalicio´ de jugadors es pot
expressar com una unio´ disjunta de coalicions factibles maximals. Aquests sistemes reben el nom de
sistemes de particio´ i donen lloc a jocs restringits. En particular, estudiem sistemes de coalicio´ definits
per un ordre parcial establert en el conjunt dels jugadors i analitzem les caracterı´stiques de coalicions
factibles construı¨t a partir de la classe de conjunts convexos.
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